1.. On 19th March in the Port of Newcastle the vessel MV "SEAKAP" conducted a lifeboat drill.
The First Mate asked the First Engineer to enter the lifeboat and be lowered in it to the water to run the boat in the harbour.
The First Engineer said that in light of the recent injuries/deaths in just such circumstances he would decline to be in the boat whilst it was lowered or raised.
The First Mate then asked the Third Engineer, who declined for the same reasons. During the boat drill a meeting was held involving Teekay's 'ship-manager' Mr Ted Ireland, who agreed their concerns were legitimate and reasonable.
On 3rd April 2003 the Master of MV Seakap Mr Wayne Parkin at 8:15 am called into his office in a preremptory and disciplinary manner the First Engineer and the Third Engineer.
The Chief Engineer was informed by the Master immediately prior and chose to attend.
The Master made demands of them that at the next lifeboat drill if any of the ship's Engineers refuse to get in the lifeboat and allow themselves to be lowered to the water he will assume that they are not participating in the drill despite their attendance at it, and he will 'sign-them-off' the ship and he will assume that they thereby resign from the employment of Teekay. [Statements from the First, Third and Chief Engineers are Exhibits AIMPE 2, AIMPE 3, and AIMPE 4 respectively]
AIMPE understands this instruction was instigated by Teekay's Melbourne office, of which Mr John Campbell is the Manager.
b.. Seafarers were obliged to attend any fire or boat drill; so much was stated by clause 23 of the Maritime Industry Modern Ships Award. This is now deleted since the Award was "Simplified" to become the Maritime Industry Seagoing Award 1999.
c.. Australia is a signatory to international regulations set by the International Maritme Organisation ("IMO") through the IMO Maritime Safety Committee. Australia gives-effect to that international convention by promulgating the international regulations via Marine Orders, which are Regulations pursuant to the Navigation Act 1912.
d.. Marine Orders Part 21 (Safety of Navigation & Emergency Procedures) requires at page 40, Section 2.1.1, inter alia, as follows :-
".A [lifeboat] drill is to be conducted in accordance with :
a.. the provisions of Marine Orders Part 25 (Equipment-Lifesaving); and
b.. the ship's Safety Management System."
As to the first of these requirements, Marine Orders Part 25 (Equipment-Lifesaving) requires, inter alia, as follows:-
a.. page 16, Section 16.5 requires that ".every motorised survival craft must have a person assigned who is capable of operating the engine and carrying out minor adjustments."; and
b.. page 17, Section 17.7 requires that ".An embarkation ladder .extending in a single length from the deck to the waterline .must be provided at each launching station."; and
c.. page 24, Section 25.3.2 requires that ".Every crew member must participate in at least one abandon ship drill .every month."
d.. page 24, Section 25.3.3.1 (e) requires that ".Each abandon ship drill must include.lowering of at least one lifeboat after any necessary preparation for launching."
e.. page 24, Section 25.3.3.3 requires that ".each lifeboat must be launched with its assigned operating crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water at least once every three months during an abandon ship drill." [AIMPE's underlining; contrast with underlined words in item 9 of this paper.]
1.. As to the second of these requirements, AIMPE does not have a copy of the existing ship's Safety Management System that applies on the MV SEAKAP, however we say as follows:-
a.. the MV SEAKAP's Safety Management System must, pursuant to Marine Orders Part 58 (International Safety Management Code) Appendix 2 (page 22),
".establish safety objectives as described in section 1.2 of the ISM Code, and in addition that the companies develop, implement and maintain a Safety Management System which includes functional requirements as listed in section 1.4 of the ISM Code."
and at Appendix 2 item 2.2.1 (page 24)
".the ISM Code identifies general safety management objectives. These objectives are:
.1 to provide for safe practices in ship operation and a safe working environment;
.2 to establish safeguards against all identified risks; and."
a.. it is the obligation of Teekay, its employees, the AIMPE and all other parties relevant under the employer's duty-of-care and OH&S principles (legislative or otherwise) for them to take action to modify the MV SEAKAP's Safety Management System to take account of a risk/hazard once identified.
b.. such modification to the MV SEAKAP's Safety Management System, consistent with Marine Orders Part 21, Section 2.1.1 [see point 4 above] would have the capacity to modify the lifeboat drill procedure set out in Marine Orders Part 25 such as to no longer require persons to be in the lifeboat whilst it is being lowered/raised.
1.. The Australian Transport Safety Bureau ["ATSB"] has investigated an increased number of accidents that occurred with persons in the lifeboat whilst being lowered or raised during a lifeboat drill.
Marine Safety Investigation Reports Nos. 128, 130, 145, 160, 164, and 173 refer, all of which have occurred in the last 5 years and typically involved no detectable mechanical fault.
An AIMPE analysis of these six Reports is attached; an unanticipated operator error is the common feature.
2.. The Australian Maritime Safety Authority issued Marine Notice 17/2002, which identifies that "..launching, retrieving and maintaining survival craft can be a high risk activity.it should be approached in such a way that any hazards are identified and mitigated." . There is an obligation on all concerned to mitigate that risk.
3.. The arguments regarding safety hazards during lifeboat drill are summarised in the AIMPE letter to AMSA of Tuesday 6th May 2003, recording minutes of a meeting held between AIMPE, TEEKAY and AMSA on Friday 2nd May 2003.
4.. AIMPE considers that the practice of having persons in the lifeboat whilst being lowered or raised during a lifeboat drill is unnecessary; if the object of the exercise is to put a boat in the water then this can be done whilst the boat is empty; other ways must be found for personnel to climb down a ladder to enter the boat and operate it, and leave the same way before it is raised.
This view is shared by significant authorities;-
a.. AIMPE relies on the comprehensive Safety Study 1/2001 "Review of Lifeboat and Launching Systems' Accidents" released May 2001 by the United Kingdom's Marine Accident Investigation Branch ("the MAIB Report") which makes a number of findings throughout, including:-
a.. ".since it was formed in 1989 MAIB has received a number of reports about seafarers being injured and sometimes killed, in accidents involving lifeboats. Scrutiny of the data held by the MAIB suggests that anyone using a lifeboat, be it in a drill or a genuine evacuation, runs a risk of being injured or even killed."
b.. "The MAIB database accumulated over a ten year period indicates that lifeboats and their launching systems have cost the lives of 12 professional seafarers, or 16% of the total lives lost on merchant ships. Eighty seven people have been injured. These accidents all occurred during training exercises or testing."
c.. the MAIB Report ".has found that people using lifeboats are exposed to the greatest risk during embarkation and recovery. It argues that if the number of people involved during these times can be minimised, the risks to individuals will be reduced, ."
d.. having noted that ".the need for navigable survival craft has largely disappeared. That they remain in service is a legacy of conditions applicable in the early 20th century and before.", the MAIB Report makes one recommendation to IMO, ".that IMO conduct a study on the present value, need, and desirability of lifeboats."
a.. AMSA, at a 2.5.2003 meeting in Canberra with AIMPE and TEEKAY confirmed that the maritime safety authority in Norway has advised the IMO that henceforth the Norwegian policy will be that during a lifeboat drill the boat will be empty when lowered or raised. AMSA advised that this was acceptable to IMO Maritime Safety Committee.
b.. AMSA, at that 2.5.2003 meeting in Canberra with AIMPE and TEEKAY confirmed that the IMO Maritime Safety Committee will in June 2003 be considering a recommendation to agree to the draft amendment DE 46/WP.7 ANNEX 3 CHAPTER III, LIFE-SAVING APPLIANCES AND ARRANGEMENTS (see attached) which will replace the IMO Convention's wording from which AMSA sourced the words ".each lifeboat must be launched with its assigned operating crew aboard and manoeuvred in the water at least once every three months during an abandon ship drill." for it's Marine Orders Part 25, Section 25.3.3.3 with the following:- ".each lifeboat shall be launched, and manoeuvred in the water by its assigned operating crew at least once every three months during an abandon ship drill." [AIMPE's underlining;]
1.. Mitigating the risk in this way is not only consistent with Marine Notice 17/2002 but will also ensure that the common law duty-of-care and the obligation imposed by section 11 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Maritime Industry) Act 1993 to undertake no unsafe activity, are met.
2.. Note also that clause 19 of the TEEKAY AUSTRALIA (BHP TRANSPORT AND LOGISTICS)/AIMPE SEAGOING ENGINEER OFFICERS ENTERPRISE AGREEMENT 2001, which applies to AIMPE members on MV SEAKAP, calls up the Occupational Health and Safety (Maritime Industry) Act 1993 and makes provision of a safe workplace a matter subject to the dispute settling provisions (clause 9) of that Agreement.
3.. The Marine Safety Investigation Reports Nos. 128, 130, 145, 160, 164, and 173, the MAIB Report, IMO-MSC Circular 1049, ATSB Safety Bulletin No. 03 and Marine Notice 17/2002 constitute a solid basis for the view to have been reasonably formed by AIMPE members on MV SEAKAP that the practice of having persons in the lifeboat whilst being lowered or raised during a lifeboat drill puts those persons at risk.
4.. Accordingly, AIMPE says that the instructions given to members of AIMPE under threat of termination of employment when they declined to be lowered/raised in a lifeboat, during a drill, for fear of their safety were:-
a.. an inappropriate response to senior employees raising a safety issue; and
b.. a breach of the company's claimed policy that ".Teekay tells all it's employees that if they see something they think is unsafe then they have the authority to stop the job!.." [Quote from Mr John Campbell to AIMPE and AMSA in Canberra2 May 2003]; and
c.. inconsistent with the company's obligations under Section 11 and Section 12 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Maritime Industry) Act 1993; and
d.. inconsistent with the obligations imposed by IMO Maritime Safety Committee /Circular 1049 on the 18th May 2002 which requires that ".Member Governments are invited to:...take the necessary action to prevent further accidents with lifeboats pending the development of appropriate IMO guidance; ensure that...the principles of safety and health at work apply to drills as well;.." [AIMPE's underlining;]
e.. prima facie an unlawful response being an offence under Section 115 of the Occupational Health and Safety (Maritime Industry) Act 1993; Unfortunately the AIMPE can not itself prosecute such a case instead only AMSA has the power do do so and could (given it's conflict of interest with Marine Orders in this case) choose not to act; and
f.. without proper regard for the disputes settling provisions of the enterprise agreement [refer to item 11 above]. AIMPE is awaiting AMSA's response to the question put in the 2.5.2003 meeting in Canberra [with AIMPE and TEEKAY ] as to whether in AMSA's view MO 21 allows MO 25 to be over-ridden by safety-issues addressed via (amendment to) shipboard safety management system policies. However AIMPE made it plain that if AMSA do not see it that way AIMPE will mount a public safety campaign regardless.
STOP PRESS!!!!!!!
AMSA has written to AIMPE agreeing with AIMPE's view of the matter and supporting AIMPE's intention of negotiating changed safety-policies onboard by company-AIMPE meetings.
